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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM ARGUING THAT THE ORDER 
VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
At pages 3, 18 and 20 of the Brief of Respondents (HBr. 
of Re."), the Board argues that Plaintiffs cannot rely on the 
provisions of Art. I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah to determine 
the propriety of the Order. The Board correctly states at page 3 
of the Br. of Re. that Plaintiff's docketing statement does not 
rely on Art. I, § 7, nor was that Constitutional provision relied 
upon by Plaintiffs in the proceedings before the trial court. 
There are well established exceptions to the general rule 
that the reviewing court will consider an appeal only upon the 
theories advanced in the trial court. For example, "Exception to 
the general rule has been made in some cases where the newly 
advanced theory involves only a question of law arising upon the 
proved or admitted facts, and is finally determinative of the 
case." 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error § 546. See State v. Lee, 
633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981); Earl M. Joraensen Co. v. Mark Con-
struction, Inc., 540 P.2d 978 (Hawaii 1975); and State v. 
Northwestern Construction, Inc., 741 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1987). Thus, 
when the new theory only involves a question of law, it is clearly 
discretionary with the court hearing the appeal as to whether there 
would be any impropriety in considering the newly advanced theory. 
Surely, since the consideration of the subject appeal on the 
theory of a violation of Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 does not require 
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the reconsideration of any facts, everyone will be better served 
by considering the issue now, rather than forcing Plaintiffs to 
present the issue upon remand or upon the filing of a new action. 
Another important exception to the general rule is that 
a new theory raised for the first time on appeal may be considered 
by the reviewing court to serve the ends of justice or prevent the 
denial of fundamental rights. See State v. Lee, supra; Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 54 L. Ed. 793, 30 S. Ct. 544 (1910); 
and Swift v. Kelso Feed Co., 161 Kan. 383, 168 P.2d 512 (Kan. 
1946). Plaintiffs have consistently maintained that the Order 
constitutes a deprivation of their fundamental rights. Even though 
such claims were couched in the context of Utah Const. Art. X, § 
8 and Utah Code Ann. 53-6-20 before the trial court, such 
fundamental rights are clearly protected by Utah Const. Art. I, § 
7 given the same facts. 
One additional exception to the general rule comes into 
play "When the question is of such a nature that the present 
welfare of the people at large, or a substantial portion thereof, 
is involved . . . . •• 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error § 551. Under 
such circumstances an appeal court is authorized in its discretion 
to direct its attention to such public concerns rather than be 
hamstrung by technical pleading. See Earl M. Jorqensen Co. v. Mark 
Construction, Inc., supra. Swift v. Kelso Feed Co., supra; and 
First National Bank v. South Land Production Co., 189 Okla. 9, 112 
P.2d 1087 (Ok* 1941). A substantial portion of the general public 
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will be well served by the court's consideration of Plaintiffs' 
Art. I, § 7 argument. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' LIBERTY INTERESTS ARE VIOLATED BY THE ORDER 
Aside from pointing out that the Honorable trial court 
Judges disagree with Plaintiffs' position, the Board relies solely 
on Logan City School District v. Kowallis, 94 U. 342, 77 P.2d 348 
(1938) for the proposition that the Order does not violate Art. I, 
§ 7 of the Constitution of Utah. As the Board correctly quotes 
Kowallis at page 23 of the Br. of Re.: 
The provision for being open . . . simply means 
that all children must have equal rights and 
opportunity to attend the grade or class of 
school for which such child is suited by 
previous training or development. 
It is also noted that there is no requirement 
that every school building shall be open to 
every school child in the state. The provision 
is that the system of public schools shall be 
open to all children of the state. There shall 
be provided, for each child in the state, a 
school suitable to its development and 
training, and as reasonably convenient for 
attendance as is practicable, which school such 
child shall have a right to attend. And when 
the public schools are open to all children on 
the same and equal terms, compliance has been 
had with this clause of the Constitution. 
(Emphasis added.) 
What the Kowallis Court said about Utah Const. Art. X, 
§ 1, is equally persuasive with respect to Art. I, § 7. Note that 
the Kowallis opinion said each child must have equal rights, not 
that it is preferable that each child have equal rights. Note also 
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that Kowallis clearly established the right to attend the school 
which is as reasonably convenient for attendance as is practicable. 
One of the great classic legal definitions is the 
definition of justice as the "equal treatment of equals." The 
Order simply does not treat equals equally. Pursuant to the Order, 
a plaintiff like Mrs. Espinal, for example, does not have a right 
to send her children to the high school as reasonably convenient 
for attendance as is practicable, while other parents of the same 
minority and socio-economic status, having children with the same 
academic achievement scores, and living the same distance from the 
same high school, are accorded such convenience. The very right 
to attend denied Mrs. Espinal's children is the very right to 
attend granted to the children of others who are indistinguishable 
from Mrs. Espinal by any criteria considered by a majority of the 
Board when adopting the Order. Such disregard of the equal rights 
belonging to all children as promised by Kowallis renders the Order 
unjust, illegal and a depravation of liberty in violation of Utah 
Const. Art. I, § 7. 
POINT III 
THE TERM PARTISAN SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED NARROWLY 
At page 24 of the Br. of Re., the Board claims that the 
Order is not prohibited by the "partisan test or qualification" 
clause of Art. X, § 8 of the Constitution of Utah because the "term 
'partisan' is generally associated with participation in a 
particular political party," and because Plaintiffs ignore the 
"common political connotation of the term." Incredibly, in support 
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of that proposition the Board cites Utah Const. Arte VIII, § 9, 
clearly having to do with the politics of elections, and an Alaska 
statutory provision which reads "any partisan political 
organization, faction or activity." The Board thus makes the 
Plaintiffs' point. Our Art. X, § 8 does not read: "No . . . 
political partisan test or qualification " On the 
contrary, such clause simply reads: "No . . . partisan test or 
qualification . . . * " 
The Board further ignores accepted rules of construction 
with its urging that "partisan" has only a political connotation. 
In a given context, as in the case of Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 9, 
the term may have that connotation, to be sure, but the context of 
its use in Utah Const. Art. X, § 8 is conclusive that more than a 
political connotation is intended. Section 8 proscribes any 
"religious or partisan test or qualification . . ." (emphasis 
added), making clear that politics was not the exclusive, or even 
dominant concern of the framers. The history of the times confirms 
that to be so. Historian Hubert Howe Bancroft chronicles how, in 
the period immediately preceding statehood, the territory was rife 
with factionalism between the Mormons and non-Mormons, or 
"gentiles." Non-Mormons were dispatched to govern the territory, 
and the Poland anti-polygamy bill and the Edmunds bill virtually 
disenfranchised the Mormons. Bancroft, History of Utah (1964) at 
682-687. The education system was subject to the same 
factionalism. Mormons established private schools, frequently 
operating out of church-owned buildings, to which gentiles were not 
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admitted, but gentiles were nevertheless required to support the 
schools through taxes. Id. at 707-709. Such discrimination in the 
context of the words used, clearly indicates that "partisan" in 
Section 8 had reference to more than politics. Just as plain is 
that "partisan" refers to factionalism within society —• to the 
dividing of students "into classes or groups and grant[ing] 
allowfing] or provid[ing] one group privileges or advantages denied 
another," as condemned in Logan City School District v. Kowallis, 
77 P.2d 348, 350 (Utah 1938). The Board's argument at page 25 of 
the Br. of Re. that if Plaintiffs' position "were carried to any 
logical conclusion, the Board would be precluded from making any 
classifications between students even if there were compelling 
reasons to do so," is a "straw man" argument. That is not what 
Plaintiffs contend. Plaintiffs have always conceded that given the 
present Constitutional and statutory provisions in Utah, students 
can be classified and assigned to attend a particular school for 
legitimate reasons, but not for the "partisan" reasons relied upon 
by the Board in adopting the Order. 
The partisanship Section 8 sought to eradicate was the 
partisanship born of blind, prejudiced, unreasoning, one-sided or 
fanatical discrimination, whether it be based upon religion, 
politics, race, ethnic origin, socio-economic status, academic 
achievement, or any other improper divisions or classifications of 
school patrons. That is precisely why Art. X, § 8 can be used to 
strike down the Order in the case at bar. 
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At page 24 of the Br. of Re., the Board also accuses the 
Plaintiffs of excluding the "element of belief or adherence to a 
cause" from the concept of partisanship. The Board's argument 
presumes that such belief constituting the prohibited "partisan 
test or qualification" must exist only in the minds of the persons 
subjected to the test or qualification. Clearly, by definition 
partisanship evidenced by the blind, prejudicial, discriminatory, 
unreasoning, fanatical, one-sided beliefs of the parties indulging 
in the partisan conduct, is no less constitutionally offensive than 
such partisanship in the minds of the targets of such partisanship. 
The Order cannot escape Constitutional condemnation by 
the narrow construction of "partisan" urged by the Board. 
POINT IV 
THE ORDER WAS NOT WITHIN THE BOARD'S STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
In Argument III beginning at page 27 and continuing 
through page 41 of the Br. of Re., the Board argues that the Order 
is authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-20. In all of those 14 
pages, the Board has no reply — not one word — to the plain 
holding of this Court, that a child "can[not] be lawfully denied 
admission to the schools of the State because of . . . location" 
or "for any cause except the child's own conduct, behavior or 
health" (emphasis added). Logan School District v. Kowallis, 77 
P.2d 348, 350 (1938). Neither has the Board any response to the 
propositions that, in the absence of segregation or similar 
Constitutional limitations, the parents' right to supervise the 
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education of their child transcends the parens patriae claims of 
the state,1 the education system may not be manipulated to 
"standardize its children,"2 efforts to do so are "arbitrary" 
unless they have a "reasonable relation to some purpose within the 
competency of the state to affect"3 (viz.., as defined at Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-6-20), and that "more than merely a 'reasonable relation' 
to some purpose within the competency of the state is required"4 
to justify a limitation on the "interests of parenthood."5 These 
are the fundamental propositions controlling this controversy. 
They may not be brushed aside, as the Board attempts to do in its 
Argument III. 
Neither may the Board avoid those holdings by urging that 
the enumeration of powers at Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-20(1) through 
(13) may be ignored on the theory that the power to do "all [other] 
things necessary" means it may do anything "convenient," "useful," 
"appropriate," "suitable," "proper" and "conducive." See Br. of 
Re. at page 35. 
Urging that the term "necessary," as used in Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-6-20(14), has such broad meaning, is unsupported by the 
authorities cited and contrary to accepted rules of statutory 
construction. Beard v. Board of Education, 81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-4 (1972). 
2Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 540, 534-5 (1925). 
3Mever v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 290, 399-400 (1923). 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, op. cit. note 2 at 232. 
5
 Id. 
8 
(1932), cited at Br. of Re. page 24, is no authority for that 
proposition, and to the contrary, plainly held that: 
The board of education, being a creation of the 
Legislature, has only such powers as are 
expressly conferred upon it and such implied 
powers as are necessary to execute and carry 
into effect its express powers. Id. at 903. 
The Court in Beard merely concluded that school buildings could be 
used for organized student dances, lectures, shows, games and 
entertainment, because a careful analysis of the Utah statutes 
indicated that such activities were part of the educational system 
as defined by our legislature. 
Thus while "necessary" may, in a given context, mean 
something less than "indispensable," the statement of that 
proposition by the Board is plainly another argument against a 
"straw man." Plaintiffs have made no such claim. To the contrary, 
we have urged merely that: 
The generality of such language, preceded by 
a specific enumeration of powers, is uniformly 
limited by the doctrine eiusdem generis. See 
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951), and the 
other authorities cited at pp. 33, 34 of 
Plaintiffs' original Brief. 
The definition of "necessary" in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
(4th Ed.) is also very instructive: 
NECESSARY. This word must be considered in the 
connection in which it is used, as it is a word 
susceptible of various meanings. It may import 
absolute physical necessity or inevitability, 
or it may import that which is only convenient, 
useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or 
conducive to the end sought. It is an 
adjective expressing degrees, and may express 
mere convenience or that which is indispensable 
or an absolute physical necessity. It may mean 
something which in the accomplishment of a 
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given object cannot be dispensed with or it may 
mean something reasonably useful and proper, 
and of greater or lesser benefit or 
convenience, and its force and meaning must be 
determined with relation to the particular 
object sought. (Citation omitted.) 
Consequently, that which is "necessary," in the context of thirteen 
specific, enumerated powers, is that which is appropriate to the 
powers enumerated. It is not merely that which is "convenient" to 
the whims of an occasional, bare majority of the Board. Beard is 
not to the contrary, for it held that the "entire control" of the 
Board must be exercised within "these sections." 
Also helpful is a well reasoned, unpublished 1983 opinion 
by Judge Bruce S« Jenkins construing a different section of Utah 
Code Ann. Title 53. The distinguished federal judge wrote as 
follows: 
" . . , in seeking statutory interpretations 
that comport with the Constitution, courts 
should read the questioned statute in the 
context of other, similar laws on the same 
subject. See e.g., Kokoszka v. Bedford, 417 
U.S. 642 (1974) ("When 'interpreting a statute, 
the court will not look merely to a particular 
clause in which general words may be used, but 
will take in connection with it the whole 
statute (or statutes on the same subject) and 
the objects and policy of the laws, as 
indicated by its various provisions, and give 
to it such a construction as will carry into 
execution the will of the legislature . . . . 
/H
 Id., at 650, quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 
How. 183, 194 (1957)); Richards v. United 
States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) ("We believe . . . 
we must not be guided by a single sentence or 
member of a sentence, but should look to the 
provisions of the whole law, and to its object 
and policy" JEd. at 11 (footnote omitted)). 
This Court must review section 53-4-15 on its 
face and within the context of other similar 
statutory provisions and seek a rational 
interpretation that will allow the statute to 
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be upheld. Downey v. Burnincrham, Docket No. 
83-1004J (U.S.D.C., D. Utah, decided 1983) at 
pp. 4-5. 
For the convenience of the Court and counsel, Judge Jenkins' 
unpublished opinion is attached in the Addendum. 
The point — which the Board ignores — is that nothing 
in the thirteen paragraphs preceding Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-20(14), 
refers to or fairly implies a power to balance the enrollment 
between the schools along racial, socio-economic or academic 
achievement lines. Nothing in the thirteen paragraphs preceding 
paragraph (14) declares, or reasonably implies, that the Board can, 
or should divide students into attendance groups based upon their 
race, or the circumstances of residing among those deemed poor or 
rich or high or low in academic achievement. Serious, frightening 
consequences would attend implication of such a power. Shall we, 
then, have students bussed between Price and Salt Lake City, or 
even within Salt Lake or Carbon Counties, to achieve such a 
balance? 
Furthermore, if we were to give the meaning to the term 
"necessary" as urged by the Board, who could look Mrs. Espinal and 
her children in the eye without blinking and say, as the Board does 
at p. 35 of the Br. of Re., that the Order is "convenient, useful, 
appropriate, suitable, proper and conducive" to the promotion of 
the education of her children, as they are bussed across Salt Lake 
City to a school distant from them. Especially when the Board says 
to them that they are being bussed because of their minority and 
11 
socio-economic status, and because they come from a neighborhood 
of low academic achievers. 
In its Argument III/ the Board also fails to offer any 
reply to the admitted fact that the Order gerrymandered the high 
school boundaries. To gerrymander means to "divide (an area) into 
political units to give special advantages to one group 
(gerrymander a school district)." See Webster's 9th New Collegiate 
Dictionary, 1988. Of course, as discussed at pp. 2 and 3 above, 
that is precisely what the Order did, and precisely why the Board 
cannot respond to Plaintiff's contention that the order 
gerrymandered the boundaries. Nothing in § 53-6-20 expressly or 
impliedly empowers the Board to enforce such a decision, and thus, 
by the act of gerrymandering alone, the Order exceeds any powers 
granted the Board by the Utah legislature, particularly § 53-6-
20. 
CONCLUSION 
It is significant that at pp. 41 and 42 of the Br. of 
Re., the Board concedes that for "compelling reasons" this Court 
can review and strike down the Order. In the instant case, those 
compelling reasons consist of the Order's violation of Plaintiffs' 
rights as guaranteed by Art. I, § 7 and Art. X, § 8 of the 
Constitution of Utah, and the Order being ultra vires the express 
and implied powers of the whole statutory scheme of public 
education at the time of the Order, as provided in Utah Code Ann. 
Title 53, and particularly by Section 53-6-20 thereof. 
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Accordingly, Plaintiffs urge that the summary judgment in favor of 
the Board be reversed and that this matter be remanded to the 
district court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor 
of Plaintiffs, including without limitation, directing notice to 
the Board of the particulars in which the Order violates the 
Constitution of Utah and exceeds the powers of the Board as granted 
by the statutes of the State of Utah, and giving the Board 
reasonable opportunity to rescind the Order and develop a voluntary 
plan consistent with Utah law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of October, 1989. 
<r>&- y • -
Kent B Linebaugh 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants was mailed, first-
class, postage prepaid, to: 
M. Byron Fisher 
John E.S. Robson 
Douglas J. Payne 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
215 S. State Street, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this 18th day of October, 1989. 
Kent B Linebaugh 
\kbl\p\0044 
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ADDENDUM 
14 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
PHILIP GORDON DOWNEY, an 
individual, and RANDI FULLER, 
an individual, and as 
Guardian ad Litem for 
Kimberly Ann Downey, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
G. LELAND BURNINGHAM, 
individually and as Superin-
tendent of Public 'Instruction, 
Utah State Board of Education 
and its members JAY A. MONSON, 
NEOLA BROWN, JESSE ANDERSON, 
LILA BJORKLUND, JOAN BURNSIDE, 
A. GLENN CHRISTENSEN, EMMA J. 
CHRISTENSEN, RODNEY L. DAHL, 
ROSS P. DENHAM, JOHN P. REDD, 
and KARL SHISLER, and the 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, father and aunt, individually and aunt as 
Guardian ad Litem, of Kimberly Ann Downey, brought this action 
against the Utah State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the 
Utah State Board of Education, and the Board of Education of the 
Jordan School District. 
Case No. C 83-1004J 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
-2- No. C 83-1004J 
In their complaint, plaintiffs assert that a newly 
1 / 
enacted Utah statute as well as the conduct of the defendants, 
2/ 
violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Plaintiffs ask that the statute be 
declared void. 
Defendant School District had sought a $1,780 tuition 
payment as a pre-condition to the registration and attendance 
of Kiraberly Downey at school. At an initial hearing held 
shortly after this action was commenced, the parties agreed that 
Kimberly Downey could attend school without prepayment of 
tuition until this matter was fully adjudicated. Briefs were 
thereafter submitted and the matter was argued to the Court on 
September 26, 1983. The parties further agreed that the issue 
presented to the Court at this stage of the proceeding was 
whether the statute was on its face violative of the Constitution 
of the United States. 
1/ Utah Code Ann. § 53-4-15 (Supp. 1983). 
2/ The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; . . . .ff U. S. Const, amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment 
provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States 
and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property 
Without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws. 
U.S. Const, amend., 14 § 1. 
-3- No. C 83-1004J 
The Court, at this stage of the proceeding, is not 
asked to decide whether the action of the Jordan School District 
in applying the statute violated the Constitution. The question 
presented is a facial question, not an application question. 
Plaintiff Philip Downey, father of Kimberly Downey, 
is domiciled and resides outside the State of Utah. He is a 
construction worker currently residing in Washington state. 
Kim's mother is deceased. Because of his desire that 
Kim be reared in a traditional family environment, Philip Downey 
arranged with his sister, Randi Fuller, for Kim to reside with 
the Fuller family. Kim has lived with the Fuller family for 
three and one-half years. 
In 1982 the Fuller family and Kimberly Downey moved 
to Sandy, Utah, located in the Jordan School District. During 
the school year 1982-83, the Fuller children and Kim Downey 
attended school in the Jordan School District. In August, 1983, 
Randi Fuller attempted to register Kim in school at the Eastmont 
Middle School. The school districtt as a prior condition, sought 
the execution of a document annexed hereto as Exhibit lfA,f, which 
contains an acknowledgement of certain facts and an undertaking 
to pay tuition. The parties refused to execute the proffered 
document and this action then resulted. It is undisputed that 
Kimberly Downey came to Utah for reasons other than attending 
school and that attending school is merely incidental to her 
living with the Fuller family. 
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In my opinion the Jordan School District and the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction have simply read the 
statute too broadly; if the statute is appropriately read, no 
question of constitutional proportion is presented- Kimberly 
Downey is simply unaffected and tuition ought not to be ex-
tracted by the school district as a condition for her attending 
school. 
Legal authority abounds that a statute enacted by the 
legislature is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. 
See e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) ("State laws 
are generally entitled to a presumption of validity against 
attack under the Equal Protection clause1' id,. , at 351); 
McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) ("Legislatures 
are presumed to have acted constitutionally . . . . and their 
statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds 
can be conceived to justify themM jld., at 809). Furthermore, 
in seeking statutory interpretations that comport with the 
Constitution, courts should read the questioned statute in the 
context of other, similar laws on the same subject. See e.g., 
Kokoszka v. Bel ford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974) ("When 'interpreting 
a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause 
in which general words may be used, but will take in connection 
with it the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and 
the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various 
provisions, and give to it such a construction as wili carry 
into execution the will of the legislature . . . .•" iA. at 650, 
-5- No. C 83-1004J 
quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857)); Richards 
v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) ("We believe . . . we must 
not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but 
should look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its 
object and policy" iji. at 11 (footnote omitted)). This Court 
must review section 53-4-15 on its face and within the context 
of other similar statutory provisions and seek a rational inter-
pretation that will allow the statute to be upheld. 
Utah chooses to administer its public school system 
through distinct governmental units known as school districts. 
See, Utah Code Ann. § 53-4-5 (1981). Although the state has 
twenty-nine counties, the state has forty school districts. 
Interdistrict administrative problems have arisen from 
time to time. For example, a child living in one district needs 
to attend school in another. A child's parent may live in one 
district and the child in another. The amount of money each 
school district receives from the state hinges in part on the 
number of students attending school in the district; children 
that attend school outside of the district in which they reside 
can have significant impact on the budget of both where he lives 
and where he goes to school. See Utah Code Ann. sections 
53-7-20, 53-7-21, 53-7-16(c)(d) (1981). 
Resolution of interdistrict problems required a 
uniform approach. In an effort to resolve such problems, the 
legislature enacted section 53-4-15 in 1983 so as to establish 
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concrete standards and uniform methods to deal with recurring 
interdistrict problems. Section 53-4-15 states that: 
(1) The school district of residence of a 
minor child is: 
(a) The school district in which the 
parent or guardian who has legal custody 
of the child is domiciled or, if the 
parent or guardian has no domicile or is 
assigned to active duty in Utah by the 
United States Armed Forces, the school 
district in which the parent or guardian 
resides; or 
(b) The school district in which the 
child resides, if the child is in the 
legal custody of a state or private 
agency, or is an emancipated minor. 
(2) Each school district is responsible for 
providing educational services for all children 
of school age who are residents of the district. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-4-15 (Supp. 1983). 
Section 53-4-15 is in part a codification of the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Logan City School District v. 
Kowallis, 94 Utah 342, 77 P.2d 348 (1938). That case concerned 
the constitutionality of a Logan City school board ruling that 
required all students who were not district residents to pay 
tuition. The Logan City School District sued residents of the 
Cache County School District, who were attending school in 
Logan but refused to pay tuition. Defendant students alleged 
that the school board was violating the Utah Constitution by 
requiring Utah residents to pay tuition. In analyzing the 
constitutionality of the school board's regulations, the court 
reviewed the legislature's approach to the public school system. 
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It summarized that approach as follows: "A review of all the 
statutory enactments from the beginning shows a recognition of 
the policy that children must attend school within the district 
in which they reside, whenever there is provided within such 
district, schools of proper grade and class to meet their needs 
and requirements.11 ]A. at 353. Based on this historical legis-
lative policy, the court held that: 
The Cache County School District, having 
provided adequate schools and facilities 
equal to those of Logan City, open and free 
and reasonably convenient for attendance of 
all children within such district, all con-
stitutional and statutory requirements have 
been met, and no child within such district 
has a legal right to insist upon attendance 
at public schools elsewhere. 
Id. at 353-54. The court concluded that the requirement that a 
resident of another school district must pay tuition in order 
to attend school in a preferred district comported with history 
and legislative intent, and did not violate the Utah Constitution, 
On its face, section 53-4-15 is merely a legislative 
effort to resolve the inter-district problem of a student 
living in one district who wishes to attend school in another. 
The statutory definition of a child's residence solves that 
problem. The statute presumes that a child's parent or guardian 
is domiciled in or resides in a Utah school district and con-
fines the child's residence to the domicile or residence of 
the Utah-located parent or guardian. However, if the child is 
emancipated or is in the legal custody of a state or private 
-8- No. C 83-1004J 
agency, the statute provides that the child's residence will 
determine where he should attend school. 
The legislature's definition of "district of 
residence11 for public school purposes simplifies a school 
board's administrative difficulties. By presuming that a child 
resides with his Utah-located parent or guardian, the statute 
allows an easy determination of which school a child should 
attend. The problems inherent in determining the number of 
school-age children in a district for the purposes of allocating 
state school funds are also eased. The definition of a child's 
district of residence is obviously applicable to interdistrict 
problems. Should the definition by implication and interpre-
tation be applied to interstate problems as well? 
In my opinion it should not. 
First, the statutory context in which the definition 
section is found is primarily concerned with interdistrict 
problems. For example, section 53-4-16 allows a child who 
resides in one district to attend school in another and allows 
a school board to charge tuition; section 53-4-17 regulates 
relations between districts and allows one district to pay 
another when a school district resident goes to school in 
another district. Second, extension by interpretation to inter-
state problems could well raise serious constitutional problems 
which are not raised by the construction herein adopted. Third, 
if the legislature wishes to address interstate problems beyond 
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what they have done in section 53-4-18 $ which permits a school 
board to allow a child "residing" outside Utah to attend school 
within the state upon payment of tuition, it may do so. 
Under the present statute it has not done so. The 
point made is narrow, but important. The-father of Kim Downey 
is neither a doraicilary nor a resident of a school district in 
Utah. Thus her presumptive "district of residence" is net 
determined by her father's location in Utah. He is not here. 
He does not live here. She is here. She lives here with her 
aunt, Randi Fuller and the Fuller family. The definition 
simply fails to define the residence of a child, living in Utah, 
whose parent lives outside the borders of the state and it need 
not do so. The likelihood of an interdistrict problem arising 
from such facts is minimal. The presumption does not carry 
beyond the border because the definition is confined to a 
parent or guardian located in the state. 
There is further statutory guidance which requires 
that Kim be admitted to school without the payment of tuition. 
The Utah Constitution requires that "[T]he legislature 
shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a uniform 
system of public schools, which shall be open to all children 
of the State, . . . .", Utah Const. Art. X, section 1, and 
defines the "public schools" as follows: 
The public school system shall include 
kindergarten schools, common schools, con-
sisting of primary and grammar grades; 
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high schools; an agricultural college; a 
university; and such other schools as 
the legislature may establish. The common 
schools shall be free. The other depart-
ments of the system shall be supported as 
provided by law. 
Utah Const. Art. X sec. 2. 
The Utah legislature has done more than implement 
the mandate of the Utah Constitution by providing that n[I]n 
each school district, the public schools shall be free to all 
children between the ages of 5 and 18 years who are residents 
of the district/1 Utah Code Ann. § 53-4-7 (1981). The legisla-
ture has also mandated that f,[e]ach school district is 
responsible for providing educational services for all children 
of school age who are residents of the district• " Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-4-15(2) (Supp. 1983). 
The Utah Code also places affirmative duties on 
persons exercising control over the child to ensure that the 
child attends school: "Every parent, guardian or other person 
having control of any minor between 6 and 18 years of age shall 
be required to send such minor to a public or regularly 
established private school during the regularly established 
school year of the district in which lie resides." Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-24-1 (1981). "He" refers to the child. The parent, 
guardian, or other person who willfully fails to comply is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. Id_. § 53-24-3 (1981) (emphasis added). 
Although the Utah Code does not affirmatively require 
the child to attend school, the child may be subject to 
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sanctions for failure to attend* For example, a person may be 
taken into temporary custody by a peace officer, truant officer, 
or public school administrator "if there is reason to believe 
the person is a child subject to the state1s compulsory educa-
tion law and that the child is absent from school without a 
legitimate or valid excuse*" Utah Code Ann. § 53-24-23 (Supp. 
1983). Or, if the child is found to be "an habitual truant from 
school," the child is subject to the broad remedial powers of 
the juvenile court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3A-16 (Supp. 1981); 
see id. § 78-3A-39 (Supp. 1981). 
In my opinion, the word"resides" found in § 54-24-1 is 
used with the common sense meaning of "lives" or "is located." 
Handi Fuller, not as a parent or a guardian, but as an "other 
person having control" must see to it that Kim attends school 
in accordance with legislative direction, and the Jordan School 
District must receive and provide Kim with the education to 
which she is entitled. 
This view is fortified by a recent pronouncement of 
the United States Supreme Court. In Martinez v. Bynum, 
U.S. , 51 U.S.L.W. 4524 (May 2, 1983), the United States 
Supreme Court defined residence: "fResidence* generally requires 
both physical presence and an intention to remain. . . . This 
classic two-part definition of residence has been recognized as 
a minimum standard in a wide range of contexts time and time 
again." LcL at 4526. Kim meets the Martinez definition of 
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residence. She is physically present in Utah. Her father 
intends that Kim live with her aunt, and Kim, herself, intends 
to live with her aunt's family in Utah, Kim is not residing in 
Utah for the primary purpose of attending school; rather, her 
reason for being in Utah is to live in a stable family 
environment. 
Because § 53-4-15 does not apply to Kim, the school 
district must treat her as it treats other residents. The 
Jordan School District is required by state law to provide free 
public schools to all children ages 5 to 18 who are residents 
of the district. Kim is twelve years old and is a resident of 
the Jordan School District. Therefore, the Jordan School Dis-
trict must allow Kimberly Ann Downey to attend school within 
the district without requiring her to pay tuition. 
This is not to say that a legislature might not adopt 
and a school district might not implement a rational policy for 
dealing with out-of-state students who come to Utah for the 
primary or sole purpose of gaining an education. Certainly one 
may adopt a definition, a standard, and a procedure for appro-
priate fact determinations in conformity with an expressly 
defined policy. In this instance, that has simply not been 
done. 
There being no need to reach the constitutional 
question, the petition to declare the statute void in violation 
of the Constitution is denied, and counsel for plaintiff is 
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directed to prepare and submit a form of judgment in conformity 
herewith. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of November, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
EXHIBIT HB" 
A G R E E M E N T 
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into on this the day of 
, 19 , by JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT (hereafter 
•the District") and 
(hereafter "Patrons"); 
WHEREAS, the Utah State Legislature has recently passed 
legislation, Senate Bill 232, authorizing the Jordan School 
District to institute a nonresident child tuition program; and 
WHEREAS, the Jordan School District has calculated that 
the per capita cost in the Jordan School District for educating 
students is $1,782.00 for the school year 1983-84; and 
WHEREAS, Patrons agree that /{,'/n h//>// /7*/> /?S;/S)/7SLS 
(Student's rfame) s 
is an out-of-state student who, pursuant to Senate Bill 232, may 
lawfully be assessed the per capita cost of the District; and 
WHEREAS, Patrons are attempting to obtain legal^gustody of 
Kl mbfs/i/ /?nrt L\y//)/i SL/ and thus not be required to 
(Student' s r f a m e ) 7 
pay a nonresident child tuition; and 
WHEREAS, the legal process to establish such guardianship 
and control has been delayed beyond the date that school begins; 
and 
WHEREAS, the District seeks to accommodate the Patrons 
by extending the time in which the tuition is to be paid; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows: 
!• Patrons will be allowed to enroll 
(Student f-s name)- ' 
^ £& *£„,*„! M/jJ/f STA^A.'/ and the District will allow 
(Name of school) 
/ / W f r / / /7//>7 ()S>AS)J>sy to attend classes. 
(Student''s name) / 
2. Patrons agree that on or before the day of 
, 1983, they will present to the District 
evidence of guardianship and/or legal custody in the form of 
duly executed court documents. 
3. If Patrons do not present evidence as outlined in 
Paragraph 2, Patrons agree to pay the District nonresident child 
tuition in the amount of $1,782.00. Patrons agree to pay said 
amount to the District on or before _ , 1983. 
JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT 
By 
PATRON 
PATRON 
